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Abstract 
 
Durable democracies display a huge variety of combinations of basic institutional 
formulas. A quantitative logical model shows that while there are multiple equilibrium 
sets of institutions, each involves some trade-off between the size of the country, the 
territorial structure of government and the electoral system. Specifically, the larger the 
country, the more important is federalism in comparison to proportional representation 
electoral rules for the durability of democratic institutions. The explanatory power of 
the model is positively tested on all current durable democratic countries. It is also 
illustrated with a few both fitting and deviant cases. A relevant implication is that the 
room for manipulation of the choice of institutions is large, but not unlimited, as the 
choices for a durable democracy are constrained by bounded trade-offs between the 
values of major institutional variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Democratic regimes display a huge variety of combinations of some basic institutional 
formulas. This paper presents an explanatory quantitative model of this variety. The 
analysis shows that there are multiple equilibrium sets of institutions, each involving 
some trade-off between the size of the country, the territorial structure of government 
and the electoral system. The choices of institutions for a durable democracy permit 
ample room for manipulation, but they are constrained by bounded trade-offs between 
the values of major institutional variables. 
William Riker famously stated that politics is a dismal science because “there 
are no equilibria to predict” (Riker 1980: 443; 1982). This statement has been disputed 
by some political scientists that emphasize the role of political institutions in inducing 
policy stability and producing “structurally-induced equilibria” (Shepsle 1979, 1986, 
1989). This response obviously implies that institutions are relatively more stable than 
policy tastes and politicians’ maneuvers. In a rather extreme version, institutions would 
tend to reinforce themselves and produce long-term durable “equilibrium institutions”, 
even if some of them can produce socially inefficient outcomes, due to the actors’ 
adaption to regularities and the cost of their replacement (North and Thomas 1973; 
North 1990; Pierson 2000). For Riker, in contrast, “rules or institutions are just more 
alternatives in the policy space, and the status-quo of one set of rules can be supplanted 
with another set of rules” (Riker 1980: 22). However, he somehow acknowledged that 
institutions tend to be relatively more stable than other policies, although the difference 
would be “in degree, not kind”. (For discussion, see Colomer 2001a; more extensive 
analysis in Colomer 2001b.) 
 In further exploration, Riker wondered, nevertheless, “about the reasons for 
stability and longevity” for constitutions and, more particularly, for certain institutional 
formulas, namely federalism. One of his main findings is “a close association between 
stability and longevity [of federations], on the one hand, and a large number of 
constituent units… on the other hand” (Riker 1987: 111-112). He gave a rationale for 
this association as usually based on incentives for actors’ strategies: “A large number of 
similar constituent units may both remove the possibility that one overweening unit 
desert or conquer the rest and simultaneously discourage small units from abandoning 
the protection of a large federation” (ibid). In short: stable federations usually have a 
large number of constituent units while unstable ones do not. (See also Riker 1996). 
This article draws on Riker’s important finding but places the stability of federal 
institutions in a broader institutional context, basically including the size of the country 
and the electoral system. A logical model is presented with quantitative measurements 
of the institutional variables and their relationships. The explanatory power of the model 
is positively tested on all current durable democratic countries. It is also illustrated with 
a few significant fitting cases and discussion of some deviant cases, which, in the light 
of this analysis, are likely candidates for either democratic failure or major institutional 
reforms.  
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2. Comparing institutional combinations 
 
That both federalism and proportional representation electoral rules can favor 
institutional stability is not a completely new idea. It has been usually presumed that in 
large and heterogeneous countries federalism and proportional representation can work 
along about the same direction in order to facilitate good governance. A large number of 
territorial political units in a federal structure can be the basis for a large, aggregative 
‘union’, while a large assembly based on proportional representation and multipartism 
can also be aggregative because it can lead to the formation of some broad government 
multiparty ‘coalition’. Both ‘union’ and ‘coalition’ can keep a large and varied country 
together by using democratic means of governance. For the same kind of reason, simple 
institutional configurations such as a unitary state and plurality rule elections with a 
single-party winner can support durable democracy in small and homogeneous polities, 
but they tend to be recipes for conflict and democratic failure in large and 
heterogeneous countries.  
However, not much specific attention has been paid to the relations between 
institutional formulas for the territorial structure of government and for elections. A few 
words in works on related subjects include, for instance, the following comments: “A 
federal system with a first-past-the-post or simple plurality vote within each single-
member constituency seems to be peculiarly well adapted to the United States, but it 
would kill democracy in heterogeneous societies” needing proportional representation 
(Balinski and Young 1982: 87); both federalism and proportional representation 
“represent complementary institutional mechanisms for the accommodation of deep 
societal divisions” (Lijphart 1999: 253; emphasis added); “the degree of proportionality 
in the electoral system will depend in part on the use of alternative mechanisms, such as 
federalism, to manage conflict and fulfill the goal of fair political representation” (Boix 
1999: 622; emphasis added); “in a democracy, political conflicts inside a parliament 
between representatives of different territorial units are best solved by federalism… 
[while] political parties form along the left-right axis and not along territorial lines” 
(Hix et al. 2007: 4).  
From these and similar comments it could be inferred that federalism and 
proportional representation are institutional devices able to be exchanged with each 
other to some extent. Territorial governments could be considered as kinds of 
intermediate, aggregative, non-ideological “parties”, while political parties may play the 
role of aggregative, non-territorial “administrations”.  
Yet in a democratic regime, different institutional formulas may produce effects 
that cannot be exchangeable. As we will see, different combinations of unitary or 
federal arrangements with majority or proportional electoral formulas can be 
appropriate for countries of different sizes. For each country size there can be multiple 
equilibrium sets of democratic institutions, but each involving a certain trade-off 
between alternative formulas. Specifically, the larger the country, the more important is 
federalism in comparison to proportional representation for the durability of democratic 
institutions. Note that I am not postulating the existence of multiple sets of equilibrium 
institutions, but of multiple equilibrium sets of institutions. Indeed every institutional 
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variable can be manipulable, but in order to produce a durable –“long-lived” in Riker’s 
terms—democratic regime, its variance must be bounded by the values of the other 
relevant institutional variables in order to produce an equilibrium set. 
In the following I consider that an explanatory and predictive model of successes 
and failures regarding the duration of different institutional regimes should include not 
only the sign of presumed associations between different alternatives, but gradations of 
effects. This can be supported by quantitative measurements of the main variables 
considered. A quantitative model can define relationships and trade-offs among 
variables in terms of “how much” one can depend on another and the expected variance 
of values.  
With this methodological orientation this article follows the project of building 
theoretically inspired models based on logical grounds that can be empirically tested 
and used for predictions within acceptable margins of error (as developed, in particular, 
by Rein Taagepera 2008). It is here generally assumed that the outcomes of human 
interactions --including, as in the topic addressed here, the choice of institutions-- can 
produce regularities amenable to being captured by mathematical formulas expressing 
relationships between well-defined variables.  
Recent discussion has identified a few more specific traits that this kind of 
model should fulfill, as I will try to do in the present article: First, a simple and relevant 
equation should include a small number of well-defined variables; second, parameters 
and coefficients should be measured; third, a mathematical equation should be based on 
reasonable hypotheses about the relationship among variables, which usually requires 
assumptions regarding actors’ motives and choices; it may have a non-linear form, but 
include multiplication, division, power or derivative (or have an additive linear format 
for the logarithms of the variables); fourth, the directionality of the relationship should 
be specified. (See discussion in Taagepera, Coleman, Colomer and Grofman 2007.) 
Relative remote precedents of this approach can be found, for instance, in 
mathematical studies of the causes and origins of arm races and wars (Richardson 1949) 
or of the conditions for optimal decentralization (Kochen and Deutsch 1969). Some 
more recent contributions have dealt with the relationships between country’s 
population and assembly size (Taagepera and Shugart 1989), assembly size, electoral 
district magnitude and number of parties (complemented with calculations for the 
largest party size and cabinet durability, Taagepera 2007), and number of parties and 
degree of policy change (Colomer 2012), among other related subjects. As several of 
these contributions are producing cumulative and complementary findings, this 
approach can contribute to a better understanding of the choice of political institutions 
and several successive stages of the political process. 
 
 
3. The Model 
 
Let’s start by comparing the population size of democratic countries with different 
institutional combinations. For the purposes of this exercise, countries are considered to 
be democratic if they are classified as ‘free’ in the Freedom House annual reports during 
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the period from 2000 to 2010 (that is, with a score lower than 3 on a scale from 1 to 7, 
Freedom House 2011). This produces a list of 82 ‘democratic’ and 110 ‘non-
democratic’ countries (including in the latter category both those whose scores 
correspond to the categories of ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ in the aforementioned 
reports). A long-term measurement is appropriate for this analysis since we do not aim 
at picturing the map of the world at any specific moment, but to estimate the durability 
of certain institutional formulas. Further on in this paper, we will consider possible 
differences in institutional stability among countries that established their democratic 
regimes in different historical periods.
1
 
The basic institutional alternatives are operationalized with simple quantitative 
variables. Federalism, taken in a broad sense as equivalent to political decentralization, 
can be measured by the number of elected territorial assemblies with political powers 
(excluding merely administrative units such as local governments) within the country. 
The values of R (for ‘regions’) vary from 1 in unitary countries, even if they are very 
large, such as for instance Japan, to 50 in the federal United States. For federal countries 
the values of R can capture the degree of decentralization of each country as a whole in  
a continuum of values. (By adopting this continuum measurement, I depart from Riker, 
who used only a trichotomous classification of countries for sets of numbers of 
territorial units.)  
Note, for instance, that according to this measure, the United Kingdom, with 
R=4 (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and “the rest”), is valued more than six times 
lower in federalism than Switzerland, with R=26, in spite of the former having a 
population eight times larger than the latter. Likewise, Spain with R=17, is valued 
almost six times higher in federalism than Portugal, with R=3, in spite of the former 
having a population only about four times larger than the latter. This measure can also 
capture the well-established Rikerian observation that federations with only two or three 
units (and thus, with low values of R), which usually implies that one unit can 
encompass an absolute majority of the population, foster polarization and conflict and 
tend to fail, while successful federations usually have high numbers of units (and thus 
high values of R).  
In turn, the electoral system for the country-wide lower chamber is measured by 
the number of seats or magnitude of the average electoral district, or M (for 
‘magnitude’). The choice of this quantitative variable is in accordance with the 
cumulative literature on the importance of the different elements of electoral systems 
(from Duverger to Rae, Lijphart, Cox, Taagepera, among others, see discussion in 
Colomer 2005). For the present exercise, the average value of M in mixed electoral 
systems has been weighted by the numbers of seats elected in districts with different 
values of M (according to the suggestion by Gary Cox 1997: 208-9). 
                                               
1 A ten-year period may serve as a proxy for longer periods because the fall of democratic regimes having 
lasted for more than a decade are rare, in spite of the high number of democratic breakdowns that have 
been registered in the last 100 years. Exceptions include Lebanon, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and 
Venezuela, none of which are included in the set of countries under examination in this paper. Polity IV 
gives data with a very high correlation with those used in this paper. See polity IV Project (2009). 
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The size of countries with multiple territorial units (R>1) is 22 times larger in 
average than the size of those with a unitary structure (R=1), as is clearly confirmed by 
Tables 1 and 2. However, the order is not consistent when the countries are also 
classified according to the variable M and combinations of the two institutional 
variables. This produces the following four categories: 1) R>1, M>1 (countries with 
multiple territorial units and multi-seat districts with proportional representation rules); 
2) R>1, M=1 (countries with multiple territorial units and single-seat districts with 
plurality or majority rule); 3) R=1, M>1 (unitary countries with proportional 
representation); and 4) R=1, M=1 (unitary countries with single-seat districts). It could 
be expected that the size of stable democratic countries would correspond to the order in 
which these four categories are listed here, from higher to lower levels of institutional 
pluralism.  
As can be seen in Table 3, the differences in population means between the first 
and second categories taken together, the third and the fourth clearly fulfill the expected 
order, but the differences between the first and the second categories if taken separately 
are small and run in the opposite direction. The groups of democratic countries in the 
first two categories, that is, those with R>1, implying some degree of decentralized or 
federal structure, have mean and median population sizes that do not correspond to the 
degree of political pluralism that can be associated with their electoral systems. 
Specifically, the federal countries with R>1 and proportional elections with M>1 are of 
smaller mean and median sizes than those in the second category with R>1 and single-
member electoral districts M=1. A durable democracy in large countries turns to be 
generally associated with federalism, as expected, but the electoral system does not 
seem to have been adopted in some of these countries on the basis of the country’s size.  
Finally, the democratic countries in the third and fourth categories are all unitary 
and of smaller size than the previous ones. Within these countries with a unitary 
structure, those with M>1 and proportional representation electoral rules have larger 
population sizes than those with single-seat districts M=1 (about 18 times larger), in this 
instance confirming the expected result.  
These preliminary observations permit us to formulate the hypothesis that some 
trade-off between alternative formulas for different institutions –for territorial 
organization and the electoral system-- indeed exists, but it is neither symmetric nor 
equally effective in countries with different sizes. It can be hypothesized that in large 
countries federalism can be more effective for good governance and durable democracy 
than any variant of electoral rules. In medium-sized countries, territorial governments 
may be less effective, possibly because even if the different groups of the population 
can be globally varied in economic or cultural terms they are likely to be more mixed in 
the territory, thus making proportional representation and multipartism more helpful.  
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Table 1. Population of countries with federal or unitary structure  
 
Number  Population  Population  No. of  Percentage of  
of regions mean  median  countries world population 
 
R>1  119,605,188 46,063,500 19  16.46 
R=1      6,998,202   2,083,500 63  83.54 
 
 
 
Table 2. Population of countries with proportional or single-seat electoral rules 
 
Electoral Population  Population  No. of  Percentage of  
magnitude mean  median  countries world population 
 
M>1  17,487,132 5,057,655 59  38.57 
M=1  72,658,937    344,000 23  61.43 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Population of countries with ‘regions’ and electoral ‘magnitudes’ 
 
Institutional  Population  Population  No. of  Percentage of  
regimes mean  median  countries world population 
 
R>1, M>1   49,707,120 39,745,613 13  23.75 
R>1, M=1 271,051,002 62,829,570   6  59.78 
R=1, M>1     8,575,221   3,433,450 46  14.82 
R=1, M=1     2,638,208      188,540 17    1.65 
 
 
 
For the country size, I choose an institutional variable with a range of values and 
distribution comparable to the two variables, R and M, previously mentioned, that is  
the size of the representative assembly or total number of seats of the single or lower 
chamber, which can be notated as S (of ‘size’). For most countries there exists a positive 
correlation between the assembly size and the cube root of the population (Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989: 173-183). This permits one to make inferences about different 
equilibrium institutions in countries of different sizes. But S has some variance of 
values and thus a certain range of choices, which can contribute to establishing 
equilibrium relationships with the other institutional variables.  
Certainly, other institutional variables could be taken into consideration, such as 
bicameralism and separate presidential elections. However, the upper chamber, when it 
exists, is in most democratic countries part of the federal design of the country and, 
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thus, somehow implicitly taken into consideration with the federal variable. The 
relations between presidents and assemblies, which involve a gradation of relative 
powers, checks and balances, should be the subject of further exploration and research 
(For an early attempt to measure separate institutional powers with quantitative values, 
see Shugart and Carey 1992). 
The ranges of values of the chosen variables for the 82 current durable 
democracies identified in the previous section are as follows: 
 
1 < R, M < S < 659 
 
Since the values of the three variables, R, M and S, are positive and their 
distributions are not normal, but rather they have large standard deviations, I use log 
values.
2
 Running the standard linear additive regression for the log values of these three 
basic institutional variables, we find a highly significant relationship between them. The 
model accounts for almost half (48%) of the variation of the assembly size in durable 
democratic countries, as shown in Table 4.    
 
lnS = 4.11 + 0.52 lnR + 0.26 lnM                             (1) 
 
 
Table 4. Assembly size, regions and magnitude, regression 
 
Variables Range  Mean  Median Coefficients Standard error 
Size S  14-659  170.89  101   
Regions R   1-50      4.73      1  0.256  (0.048) 
Magnitude M   1-598    25.83      6.57  0.519  (0.057) 
Constant       4.112  (0.204) 
Robust R
2
       0.476 
p-value       0.000 
 
Data sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union-Parline Database (2009), IFES’ Election Guide (2009) and ACE 
Project (2009), The World Factbook (2009) and country sources. 
 
 
The placement of S in the function as the ‘dependent variable’ should not be 
confusing. Actually the model can accept bidirectional lines of causality, as all variables 
are to some extent interdependent, rather than independent or dependent. On the one 
hand, the choices of institutional alternatives for territorial structure and the electoral 
system, R and M, can be in equilibrium in a country of a certain size if the subsequent 
choice of S, although it keeps within the limits of significance in relation to the country 
                                               
2 The standard deviation exceeds the mean slightly in the distribution of S values, two times in the 
distribution of R values, and three times in the distribution of M values. In order to always work with 
positive log values, since R and M have minimum values at 1, whose logarithm is 0, one unit is added to 
the values of the variables, so that lnR+1 = 1 when R=1, and lnM+1=1 when M=1.  
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population, takes the appropriate value to accommodate those choices. In the opposite 
direction, S can just reflect the size of the country and lead to the choice of matching 
territorial and electoral institutions. As all the variables are manipulable, multiple 
equilibria can result from trade-offs between institutions. 
Generally, the choices of institutions can derive from strategic calculations by 
self-interested political actors in different dynamic processes. If the resulting 
institutional choices are attuned to the size and structural characteristics of the country, 
they may obtain endogenous support and endure. Specifically, if in a large country 
multiple territorial governments are established, much political action will focus on 
those local institutions and it will be less likely that multiple political parties will be 
formed at the country-wide level, and as a consequence there will be less pressure to 
adopt a large assembly and an electoral system of proportional representation (the 
United States, for instance, would be a case in point). In contrast, in a medium-sized 
country with a unitary territorial structure but with a variety of economic interests or 
cultural allegiances, the formation of multiple political parties may push for a 
sufficiently inclusive assembly elected by proportional electoral rules, rather than for 
territorial governments (like, say, in the Netherlands). The relationships between 
institutional variables are always established through the intermediation of collective 
action. 
A crucial point to exploit the analytical potential of this model is to take the 
coefficients seriously. Since all values of the variables are positive, we can build a 
model of a multiplicative format by shifting from (1) to antilogarithms (and rounding 
coefficients just a little): 
 
S = 62 * R
1/2 
* M 
¼                                                            
(2a) 
 
which can also be written as: 
                                                    (2b) 
where: 
S: Size or total number of seats of the country’s assembly, which is a proxy for the size 
of the country in terms of population. 
R: Number of territorial units or regions with elected assembly and political power, 
which is a proxy for decentralization and federalism. 
M: Magnitude or number of seats in the average electoral district, which is a measure of 
the inclusiveness of the electoral system and a proxy for multipartism. 
 
We can interpret this equation the following way. First, the positive and 
multiplicative relationship between R and M indicates that both territorial governments 
and proportional representation are associated with durable institutional regimes in large 
countries, as expected. This is confirmed by the positive and significant relationships of 
each of the two variables with S if taken separately (for S and R, R
2
 = 0.34, p-value = 
0.000; for S and M, R
2
 = 0.16, p-value = 0.000). 
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Second, there is no overlap between R and M. This confirms that “federalism is 
compatible with a variety of electoral rules at both national and territorial levels” (as 
stated in the survey by Weaver 2002: 115). In other words, both territorial governments 
and proportional elections can help make a country governable in democracy as the size 
of the country increases, but their effects are pretty independent from each other. As we 
can also test now with the operationalized quantitative values of the two variables, the 
correlation between R and M is almost inexistent (R
 
= 0.008, p-value = 0.43).  
Third, the exponential form of the function (2b) implies that the impact of 
increases in the values of R and M diminishes the higher are these values. The double 
power for R than for M indicates that the positive effect of a large number of territorial 
units or ‘regions’ is higher than the effect of a large electoral district ‘magnitude’. Due 
to the exponential form the difference in effects between R and M increases with the 
size of the country. For small countries with low values of S, the variables R and M can 
take similar values (at the limit, R = M = 1). In medium-size countries, multiple 
combinations of moderate values of R and M –some territorial decentralization and 
proportional elections-- can work. But the larger the country, the more important the 
increases in the values of R become in comparison with increases in M to account for 
the stability of institutions in enduring democracies. 
3
  
This result, therefore, supports the hypothesis that the larger the country, the 
more effective and durable federalism can be, to the point of being compatible with very 
diverse electoral systems for the lower chamber. The results given by equation (2b) for 
some specific countries will be reviewed as an illustration of the analytical and 
predictive potential of the model. Before that, let’s discuss possible supplementary 
elements.  
 
 
4. Extensions 
 
As an exploration of other possible relevant features and how they can be related to one 
another, a number of additional variables have been added to the statistical analysis just 
reported. They basically refer to the economic and cultural heterogeneity of the 
population, colonial legacy, and the period in which democracy was initiated. 
 
Population heterogeneity. A country’s economic and cultural heterogeneity might be 
considered a relevant factor to explain governance problems and the appropriateness of 
complex institutional design. This hypothesis can be based, for example, on the fact that 
“every single longstanding democracy in a multilingual and multinational polity is a 
federal state” (Stepan 1999: 19). However, the statistical analysis with the available data 
is inconclusive and does not permit us to improve the function by modifying the 
                                               
3 The difference between the weights of R and M in the equation is not dependent on the difference 
between their ranges of values, since it holds also for the mean values of the two variables; for the 
countries with R>1 the mean value of R = 16 and for the countries with M>1 the mean value of M = 35, 
thus R1/2 = 4 > M1/4 = 2.4. 
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assumption that country size is a sufficiently good proxy for governance costs, as shown 
in Table 5.  
Specifically, for economic variety of the country, two variables have been 
considered. The first is the proportion of the active population of the country employed 
in agriculture as a measure of diversification of the economic activity of the population 
(as was already used, for instance, by Powell 1982). But it turns out to be irrelevant for 
the issue under discussion.  
The second variable related to economic variety is the proportion of a country’s 
foreign trade out of its GDP, which may indicate some degree of differentiated 
interested between inward- and outward-oriented sectors of the population. As should 
be expected, it appears negatively correlated with the measures of size, the country’s 
population (Pop) and the country’s area (A), as well as the assembly size or S. Foreign 
trade is also negatively and significantly correlated with the measure R for federalism 
(but not with M for the electoral system). This is an interesting finding, but it may not 
improve our institutional analysis. It basically means that the more decentralized the 
country the lower its proportion of foreign trade, but this can be due precisely to the fact 
that within a large federal country there is extensive ‘domestic’ trade among people and 
firms located in its different internal territorial units, whereas people and firms located 
in a small unitary country can develop similar amounts of trade with partners located at 
similar distances, but across borders, which counts as ‘foreign’. It is therefore the 
institutional structure, whether a large federation or a small independent country, that 
may make the counting of long-distance trade different, not the trade that can explain 
institutional choices. 
For cultural heterogeneity I choose the fractionalization index calculated by 
Alesina et al. (2003), which is a combination of race and language characteristics of the 
population. None of the correlations of this index with the measures of size, S, Pop and 
A, or with the institutional measures of federalism, R, and the electoral system, M, 
appear to be statistically significant. I also calculated correlations with alternative 
indices, the language and the religion index in Alesina et al. 2003, the diversity index 
calculated by Fearon 2003, and the one provided by Ethnologue (Grimes 2005), 
obtaining even less significant results.
4
  
 
                                               
4 Other operationalizations of data and indices of ethnicity are discussed by Cederman and Girardi (2007). 
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Table 5.  Institutional and heterogeneity measurements  
 
   lnS lnA lnPop lnR lnM 
 
Agriculture (percentage of active population)    
Coefficient            -0.018 0.156 -0.494 0.027 -0.035 
Adjusted R
2  
0.017
 
0.002  0.004 0.026  0.027 
p-value   0.156 0.716  0.387 0.107  0.103 
 
Foreign trade (percentage of GDP)  
Coefficient  -0.008 -8.623 -10.68 -0.009  0.003 
Adjusted R
2
   0.158  0.233  0.241  0.168 -0.004 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.405 
   
Ethnicity index   
 Coefficient  -0.658 0.804 -0.427  0.345 -0.072 
Adjusted R
2   
0.007
 
-0.01 -0.011 -0.008 -0.012 
p-value    0.218 0.631  0.743  0.550   0.927 
  
Data sources:  
Percentage of active population employed in agriculture for 64 democratic countries with available data, 
and Foreign trade as a percentage of GDP for 72 countries with available data, from World Bank 
Development Indicator. Ethnicity index for 82 democratic countries from Alesina et al. (2003). 
 
One problem with the available measurements of cultural heterogeneity may be 
that they are calculated at the country level and do not capture the dispersion or 
concentration of the population, which can be more relevant to explaining problems of 
governance. It can be presumed that over a long term, people of similar race, sharing a 
common language or with close preferences on religion tend to live near to one another. 
Relatively low levels of cultural heterogeneity can also be the result of endogenous 
formation of preferences within a community, since sustained conviviality promotes 
greater uniformity of cultural tools, beliefs and values (or ‘exit’ to communities with 
more similar or easier preferences to which to adapt). Then, within a large country, an 
institutional structure based on multiple territorial governments can help relatively 
homogeneous small communities to live in peace and good governance, even if the 
country as a whole is highly heterogeneous in cultural terms as measured by the 
available indices. Conversely, considerable problems for governance can be correlated 
with high levels of heterogeneity of the population living in relatively small 
communities, which may not be linearly dependent on the heterogeneity of the country 
taken as a whole.
5
  
                                               
5 There has been some recent discussion about the importance of local heterogeneity. In particular, some 
recent studies of civil wars suggest that conflicts and violence within countries are significantly related to 
large country size in terms of population, as well as to state weakness and political instability, but not so 
much to ethnic or religious diversity as measured at country level (Collier 2000; Reynal-Querol 2002; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
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Attempts to measure local heterogeneity include the Minorities at Risk Project 
(2009), but the manageable values are available for only a limited number of 
“minorities” considered as being “at risk of rebellion, protest, or repression”, not for all 
cultural (race, religious and language) groups in democratic countries, and they are 
given as a simplified dichotomous classification.  
In the absence of sufficient local or micro-level data, I explored the potential 
usefulness of taking into account a variable as simple as the population density of the 
country (that is, the quotient between population and area). Let us briefly consider the 
polar cases to give ground to a hypothesis concerning its potential effects. Low density 
usually implies territorial dispersion of the population in several distant or separate 
groups. Even if the country’s population as a whole is relatively homogeneous, the costs 
of governance related to physical distance might make federalism an advisable formula 
for a durable democracy. Australia, for one, would be an example of this. If, in addition, 
the country’s population taken as a whole is very heterogeneous, it is likely that the 
population may be disperse in different groups with relatively high degrees of internal 
homogeneity, as argued above and as largely happens, for instance, in Canada. Non-
ideologically, territorial governments could then be based on relatively homogeneous 
communities. Federalism might then be appropriate formulas for good governance and 
durable democracy in countries with this type of structure, that is, with low density of 
the population.  
On the other pole, high population density is likely to imply local heterogeneity, 
whether in economic terms, as high density is usually related to high degrees of 
urbanization and diversification of economic activity, or in cultural terms, which may be 
produced by recent migrations. With this type of structure, federalism may not be a 
suitable solution since the creation of small territorial governments would not reduce 
much the complexity of the communities, while proportional representation might be 
more adapted to the formation of multiple, non-territorially based political parties able 
to represent different interests and values within a mixed population. (See related 
discussion in Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2007.) 
 A simple test shows that, among durable democracies, the values of population 
density for countries with alternative institutional formulas differ in the expected 
direction. Specifically, the average population density of democratic countries, as given 
by number of inhabitants per square kilometer, is 126 for countries with R>1 and 175 
for those with R=1. For the electoral system, the differences are, also as expected, in the 
opposite direction, but they are more modest: 166 for the countries with M>1 and 155 
for those with M=1 (while the same direction holds for subsets: among the countries 
with R>1, 129 for those with M>1 and 119 for those with M=1; among the countries 
with R=1, 186 for M>1 and 169 for M=1).
6
 Federal countries have more dispersed 
populations than unitary ones, while countries with proportional representation have 
                                                                                                                                         
 
6 These calculations exclude the outlier Botswana, whose value of density has four figures, in contrast to 
the range of values for all the other countries which have between one and three figures; its inclusion does 
not change, however, the direction of the relationships just reported. 
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higher population densities that those using majority electoral rules. While the 
suggestion to take country-wide population density as an index of local heterogeneity 
might be exploited in further research, I think, however, that at this preliminary stage it 
does not offer sufficiently different quantitative values to be worth including in the 
basic model presented above.  
 
Colonial legacy. It is common knowledge that single-seat electoral districts with 
plurality rule was a usual institutional legacy in former British colonial dominions 
(single-seat districts with majority rule runoff could be a French colonial legacy too, but 
there are very few cases with this in the past among current durable democracies). A 
cursory inspection of the 26 former British colonies within our set of countries shows, 
however, that a number of them have escaped from the traditional British institutional 
model. The larger of these countries, while keeping single-seat districts (M=1), have 
adopted a federal structure (R>1), which, as mentioned, is the most effective mechanism 
to deal with governance in a large country (they include Australia, Canada, India, the 
United States, and, more recently, even partial decentralization in the United Kingdom). 
Others of middle size have adopted multimember districts with proportional 
representation rules (M>1) (Cyprus, Guyana, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Tuvalu) 
or both R>1 and M>1 (South Africa). The remaining 14 former British colonies with 
R=1 and M=1 are very small countries in terms of population (excepting only Botswana 
and Ghana).  
In the past, a number of former British colonies in Africa and Asia having 
adopted the colonial metropolis’ formula (implying R=1 and M=1) for their first 
democratic experience failed, especially in countries with high ethnic diversity or 
relatively large size. But among the current durable democracies in former British 
colonies, although a few large countries maintain single-seat districts, the size variable 
is sufficiently descriptive to sustain the correlation with the institutional alternatives. 
The subsequent regression including the condition of former British colony as a factor 
for M=1 is not statistically significant. 
 
Old and recent democracies. Finally, I have considered whether relatively old and new 
democracies may have adopted different alternative institutions. An apparently 
reasonable hypothesis might be that old democracies may have nowadays institutional 
regimes that are more apt at dealing with the problems of governance derived from size 
and social complexity than recent democracies because they tend to adjust to social and 
political changes by means of periodical institutional renewals and actors’ adaptations. 
This hypothesis might be supported by major institutional reforms in favor of creating 
territorial governments in large, previously unitary European states, including Italy, 
France and partially the United Kingdom, as well as some electoral reforms moving 
away from single-seat districts to electoral systems with M>1, such as in Japan and New 
Zealand.  
  Alternatively, it can be postulated that recent democracies have learned from 
previous experiences (and perhaps the advice of political scientists and alike) to adopt 
institutional alternatives better suited to their size and the associated problems of 
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governance than older democratic experiences. The fact that among the new 
democracies established in countries with more than one million inhabitants since the 
1970s there is almost no case in which the old British model involving R=1 and M=1 
has been adopted might support this alternative hypothesis.  
The results of the ensuing empirical test provide strong support to the model 
based on country sizes. I have re-run the basic multivariate linear regression between S, 
R and M for the set of 27 countries with current ‘old’ democracies established before 
1974 and for the set of 55 countries with ‘recent’ democratic regimes. The results are 
statistically highly significant for both. But the coefficients are different. For the old 
democracies, R is much more important than M in explaining the variation in the sizes 
of the countries. For the more recent democracies, both R and M have similar weights. 
Looking at the sizes of the countries in the two sets, we note the recent proliferation of 
medium-sized and small countries. The old democracies have a median population 
equal to 74 million inhabitants and a mean S= 251, while the recent ones have a median 
population of 13 million and a mean S= 132. The differences in the choice of 
institutional alternatives between the two sets of old and recent democracies can, 
therefore, be largely explained by the different sizes of the countries involved. A large 
number of the old democracies that have been able to survive were established in 
relatively large countries with federalism (R>1), whether with proportional rules or 
single-seat electoral districts (M>1 or M=1), as well as in some medium-sized countries 
with a unitary structure and proportional representation (R=1 and M>1). By contrast, 
most of the more recent democracies have been established in medium-size countries 
with proportional representation (M>1), whether with federal or unitary structure (R>1 
or R=1), as well as in a number of new small countries with simple institutional 
formulas (R=1 and M=1), but no case has involved R>1 and M=1, in contrast to large 
countries in the first period.
7
 
 
 
5. Explaining and predicting choices of institutions 
 
The main result of the analysis in this paper is equation (2b): 
 
which accounts for about half of the variation of the operationalized values of assembly 
size, federalism and the electoral system in durable democratic countries. The equation 
is valid for two-thirds of the countries (55 out of 82 cases) within a factor of two.
8
 
                                               
7
 The subsequent regressions are, for the 27 countries with current democracy established before 1974: 
lnS = 5.0 + 0.44 lnR + 0.1 lnM (R2: 0.47, p-value: 0.000).  
For the 55 countries with current democracy established since 1974:  
lnS = 3.9 + 0.39 lnR + 0.35 lnM (R2: 0.45, p-value: 0.000).  
8
  Since this is a multiplicative function, giving the error ranges as a multiplication can be equivalent to 
giving the error as a sum +/- of some value for an additive function. For previous applications and 
discussion of this criteria, see especially Taagepera (2008). 
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 To see how to analyze the fit of the equation for each country, let us discuss a few 
examples. As we will see, the quantitative trade-offs implied by equation (2b) can 
produce multiple institutional combinations in equilibrium. 
An illustrative case of a large country with R>1 and M>1 may be Italy, whose 
values are S= 630, R=20, and M=24.2. According to equation (2b), the expected value 
of S should be equal to 62*(20)
1/2
*(24.2)
1/4
 = 63*4.5*2.2 = 615, pretty close to the 
actual value of 630. Actually, the Italian lower chamber is oversized regarding the 
country’s population and the cube root law mentioned above. But according to the 
analysis here presented, the large size of the assembly (that is, the high value of S) is 
consistent with the option for having both a decentralized regional structure and a 
proportional representation electoral system (that is, high values of both R and M).  
Alternatively, a large country can work consistently with R>1 and M=1, as we 
discussed in section 3. In the case of the United States, the values are S= 435, R=50, and 
M=1. According to equation (2b), the expected value of S should be equal to 
62*(50)
1/2
*(1)
1/4
 = 62*7.1*1 = 438, very close to the actual value of 435. The United 
States has the maximum value of R and the minimum value of M. The very high 
number of 50 states somehow compensates for the smallness of single-seat districts to 
make a satisfactory fit among the three institutional variables. 
Consistently, in this case we find for S a deviation in the opposite direction, 
since the U.S. House of Representatives is undersized regarding the country’s 
population and the cube root law. During the nineteenth century, the size of the House 
was regularly increased to account for population growth, but in spite of the increase in 
the country’s population it has remained frozen since it was fixed at 435 seats in 1911. 
At that moment this was an almost exact fit with the cube root of the population. At 
about the same time the borders were fixed and 48 states had been admitted to the 
Union. 
Subsequently, certain additional processes not included in the simple model 
presented in this paper may have helped institutions to work relatively smoothly, in 
spite of the population increase. In particular, internal migrations and periodical 
redistricting tended to reduce the heterogeneity of the population in each state and in 
each electoral district, respectively, making the election of representatives with broad 
support at those levels relatively easier. (For recent defenses of redistricting for good 
democratic performance, see Buchler 2007; Brunell 2008). Also primary elections 
permit the inclusion of people from varied groups and with different values within a few 
broad political parties. These additional mechanisms have become more relevant since 
the mid- or late-twentieth century, as the country’s population increased. Nevertheless, 
proposals to increase the number of seats in the House to the cube root of the population 
have also been raised (for review and discussion, see Ladewig and Jasinski 2008). 
The two examples of Italy and the United States suggest that for large countries 
some deviations of S values from the cube root of the country’s population can be 
explained for consistency with actual choices regarding institutions such as R and M. If 
the latter imply high levels of territorial and political party pluralism, as in Italy, 
possibly due to multiple and diverse group pressures across the country and institutional 
choosers’ wish to embrace faithful representation of the variety of the population, the 
 17 
general assembly must be sufficiently large to capture that pluralism. If, in contrast, 
constitution-makers privileged the representation of varied territories, but were wary of 
the perils of multipartism when they chose the electoral institutions (or just imported 
them from the colonial metropolis before new rules of proportional representation had 
been invented), like in the United States, then the size of the federal assembly can 
remain relatively small. For each country size there can be therefore multiple 
equilibrium sets of institutions, but each of the sets involving different combinations of 
institutional alternatives will be in equilibrium if it is consistent with the quantitative 
trade-offs between institutions identified above. 
Following a Riker’s suggestion, we can also try to use “the byproducts of the 
scientific investigation to assess the value of reforms proposed to remedy instability” 
(Riker 1987: 115). Specifically, the asymmetric trade-off between federalism and 
proportional representation can cast light on the outcome of recent attempts at electoral 
reforms. Several initiatives to introduce proportional representation rules failed in 
federal countries, mainly in Canada and the United States, while successful reforms in 
the same direction took place in unitary countries, like Japan and New Zealand (for a 
review of these cases, see Blais 2008). According to the above-stated trade-off, 
federalism may thwart proportional representation in well-established democracies, 
while a unitary structure may leave more room for electoral reform.  
Most of the lack of fit of equation (2b) is with small countries having ‘too low’ 
values of S. As had already been noted by Rein Taagepera in his seminal presentation of 
the cube root law, countries whose populations are less than one million and small-
island nations tend to have smaller assemblies than expected (see the updated review 
and discussion in Taagepera 2007: 188-190). This might reflect the relatively lesser role 
of those assemblies as the viability of these countries is usually dependent on 
membership in larger alliances or unions, in a similar way as also regional and local 
assemblies fall short of the cube root law, as suggested at the beginning of this paper. 
But this is a subject deserving further discussion. If small countries are dropped from 
the sample, for the countries with more than one million inhabitants in our set of 
durable democracies the fit of the model as given by equation (2b) increases to 83% (44 
out of 54 countries).  
In the opposite direction, there are a few countries whose quantitative 
institutional values do not fit our model because they have ‘too low’ values of M or R in 
comparison to their values of S (and also in comparison to the cube root of the 
population). These are the following. Ghana, which experienced several shifts between 
democracy and non-democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, soon after independence, keeps 
plurality rule in single-seat districts, the British colonial legacy.  
Mali, a former French colony, has used single-seat districts with majority rule 
runoff, like its former colonial metropolis. Recent developments have shown the 
fragility of this institutional framework. For Mali’s second democratic election in 1997, 
an agreement between the government and the opposition introduced proportional 
representation rules, but it was declared unconstitutional by the judiciary; the 
subsequent election was annulled, a second call was boycotted by the main opposition 
parties, and a majority runoff was used again for the elections since 2002. Yet in 2012 
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an anti-democratic military putsch was enforced while a northern region declared 
secession.  
Greece recently uses a small M as the result of its politicians holding the world 
record for continuous manipulation of the electoral system, while its party system has 
been shaken. Japan and South Korea also have small M, in spite of having recently 
adopted mixed electoral systems of single-seat districts and proportional representation; 
as these followed periods with majoritarian formulas, they may have been just an 
intermediate step towards increasing proportional rules. Japan, in addition, is the largest 
democratic country in the world with a unitary structure, certainly supported by the 
compact ethnic homogeneity of its population. Finally, Romania, which is the largest 
country within the European Union that has not adopted a decentralized structure, is 
also suffering some institutional stress. 
The case of greatest misfit for the model is the United Kingdom, one of the 
oldest democracies in the modern world, which involves both low values of M and R 
and an extremely high value of S. The British House of Commons, which is the largest 
assembly of all democratic countries (S=659), has maintained almost the same size as 
the so-called Imperial Parliament established in the early nineteenth century (actually 
following the pattern of its predecessors the parliaments of Britain and of England), 
apparently to give room to a complex set of representatives from counties, boroughs, 
towns, universities and other types of districts. Since the late 1990s the United Kingdom 
implemented limited decentralization, that is, an increase of R, with devolution to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It was initially planned that nine English regions 
would also be formed, but the project was abandoned after the failure of the first 
referendum in North East England in 2004. At about the same time, an attempt at 
electoral reform which would have increased the value of M was launched, but it 
attained some success only for chambers other than the House of Commons (including 
for the European Parliament). In the United Kingdom, the federal-proportional trade-off 
may have limited the complete development of both reforms simultaneously and 
stopped the two initiatives mid-way. More recently, a formal proposal to reduce the size 
of the House of Commons was included in the government’s program for institutional 
reform in 2010. 
In spite of its ‘deviated’ set of institutional combinations, the United Kingdom 
seems to have a solid democracy –certainly supported by additional factors not captured 
by our simple institutional model. The other countries just reviewed, in contrast, have 
poorer democracy scores than the average (1.88, in contrast to 1.43 for the remaining 
countries in the set, according to Freedom House ten-year average scores). Within the 
set of the durable democracies, Ghana, Mali, Greece, Japan, South Korea and Romania 
seem to be among most likely candidates either for major institutional reform or further 
democratic deterioration.  
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6. Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper I have discussed the configuration of equilibrium democratic institutions in 
countries of different sizes. Quantifiable trade-offs between different institutional 
alternatives have been identified. Specifically, in small countries, a unitary structure 
with elections in single-seat districts and a small assembly can be sufficient to identify 
majority preferences and enforce collective decisions. This is the case in almost all 
mini- and micro-states with less than one million inhabitants. In contrast, in medium-
sized countries, a democratic regime may rely upon proportional representation of 
multiple parties to obtain greater endogenous support. In fact proportional 
representation began to be adopted for parliamentary elections in the early twentieth 
century in a few medium-sized European countries, such as Belgium, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden, soon followed by Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland, and has 
spread widely among new democracies in medium-sized countries across the world in 
recent decades. A most relevant finding is that the larger the country, the more 
important federalism is in establishing an equilibrium institutional framework, to the 
point of being compatible with diverse electoral systems for the lower chamber. Large 
federal countries include, for instance, proportional Argentina, Brazil, Germany and 
South Africa, as well as majoritarian Australia, Canada, India and the United States.  
A quantitative logical model has specified the greater positive effect of a large 
number of territorial units in comparison with the effect of a sizeable electoral district 
magnitude as the country size increases. Regarding Riker’s assumption that “the status-
quo of one set of rules can be supplanted with another set of rules”, we find that indeed 
all the institutional variables, including the size of the assembly, are manipulable to 
some extent. For each country there can be, thus, several equilibrium sets of institutions, 
but all in accordance with the trade-offs between institutions mentioned above.  
The model accounts for about half of the variation of the operationalized 
institutional variables in durable democratic countries. Equation (2b) establishing 
quantitative measurements and relationships among the basic institutional variables for 
assembly size, territorial structure and the electoral system produces a satisfactory 
statistical fit for two-thirds of the current democratic countries (and more than fourth 
fifths of those with more than one million inhabitants).  
The model presented in this paper can provide a parsimonious and consistent 
explanation of the variety of combinations of some basic institutional alternatives in 
durable democratic countries. In future research, additional variables could be added to 
refine the model, especially for cultural heterogeneity of the population, as appropriate 
data and operationalization became available, as well as for other institutional 
mechanisms, especially for separation of powers between presidents and assemblies. 
The model should provide predictive capacity able to support forecasts and practical 
advice. An efficient, attuned institutional design can be crucial, in particular, for the 
success of attempts at state- and nation-building in former colonial and non-democratic 
territories of different sizes.  
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